What is the relation between political philosophy and real-life politics? Indeed, do political philosophers have a role to play in politics? There is a long tradition – within liberalism as elsewhere – of political philosophers being motivated by political (rather than more abstract, theoretical) concerns, and indeed doing politics. Mill is perhaps the clearest example within liberalism. But there is also a tradition of political philosophers criticizing each other for not doing enough politically (a central example here, perhaps, is Marx’s (1845) complaint that most philosophers have settled for interpreting the world whereas the point is to change it). And in the opposite direction, there are influential political philosophers who think that an important mistake of political philosophers is that they think of themselves as political advisors, pretending that major political agents eagerly await their texts and advice (Waldron 1995), so that the way forward in political philosophy is to take it further away from political practice.

To an extent, recent liberal political philosophy – especially in its dominant Rawlsian version, with its emphasis on ideal theory, and on especially stringent neutrality requirements, applying the principle of tolerance to philosophy itself (Rawls 1996) – has become less and less relevant for real-life politics. Unlike some other thinkers interested in politics (feminists are a prime example), the political liberal seems to think of him- or herself – at least in their capacity as a political philosopher – not as a participant in the political arena, but rather to an extent as a neutral referee between those in the arena.

This is not a promising way forward (Enoch 2013; 2015; Nili Manuscript). True, it is not a plausible requirement that political philosophers be also politically effective (though some may be), and a good theory in political philosophy need not immediately translate into an implementable political platform (though some may). A more plausible requirement – which a comprehensive defense of liberalism will have to satisfy – is that there should not be too unbridgeable a gap between political philosophy and political activism, that the two projects can be seen as continuous with each other.

This part, then, will discuss the precise relation between political philosophy and politics, the role (or roles) of the political philosopher, and how, if at all, such a role can be played by a liberal political philosopher. The question discussed is not, of course, whether a political philosopher can also be politically active – of course he or she can. Rather, the question is whether there are interesting constraints that apply to them as a political philosopher, whether they have a special contribution they are especially qualified to make precisely because they do political philosophy. Here too the discussion will be normative and conceptual, though it may be informed by empirical (perhaps historical) data about the role of political philosophers in politics.